In this paper, we discuss infinite-horizon soft-constrained stochastic Nash games involving state-dependent noise in weakly coupled large-scale systems. First, we formulate linear quadratic differential games in which robustness is attained against model uncertainty. It is noteworthy that this is the first time conditions for the existence of robust equilibria have been derived based on the solutions of sets of cross-coupled stochastic algebraic Riccati equations (CSAREs). After establishing an asymptotic structure along with positive definiteness for CSAREs solutions, we derive the formula for Newton's method for solving CSAREs. As another important feature, we propose a high-order approximate Nash strategy based on iterative solutions. Finally, we provide a numerical example to verify the efficiency of the proposed algorithms.
Introduction
Over the last decade, stochastic control problems governed by Itô's differential equation have attracted considerable research interest. Recently, the stochastic H ∞ control problem with state-and control-dependent noise was investigated (Ugrinovskii, 1998; Hinrichsen and Pritchard, 1998) . It has attracted considerable attention and has been widely applied in various fields. In particular, the stochastic H 2 /H ∞ control with state-dependent noise has been addressed (Chen and Zhang, 2004) .
Linear quadratic Nash games and their applications have been widely investigated in many literatures (e.g. Petrovic and Gajić, 1988; Mukaidani, 2006 Mukaidani, ,2007a Mukaidani, ,2007b for weakly coupled large-scale systems). Nash game as a concept has its roots in decision making and has been applied to various control fields (Basar and Olsder, 1999; Engwerda, 2005) . However, robust Nash equilibrium in deterministic uncertain systems has not been investigated thus far. In contrast, robust equilibria in indefinite This work was supported in part by the Research Foundation for the Electrotechnology of Chubu (REFEC) and a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists Research (B)-18700013 from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan. This paper was not presented at any IFAC meeting. Corresponding author H. Mukaidani Tel. .
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linear quadratic differential games under a deterministic disturbance input affecting systems have been discussed (Broek et al., 2003; Engwerda, 2005 Engwerda, ,2006 . Although the results in (Broek et al., 2003; Engwerda, 2005 Engwerda, ,2006 are very elegant in theory and despite it being easy to obtain a strategy pair by solving the cross-coupled algebraic Riccati equations, stochastic uncertainty is an issue that remains to be considered.
On the other hand, stochastic Nash games have been widely studied (Buckdahn et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2006) . Although many results are available on stochastic Nash games, they are limited to stochastic uncertainty, such as the Wiener process without deterministic disturbance. For practical applications, both deterministic and stochastic uncertainties should be considered. This can be convincing motivation to investigate soft-constrained stochastic Nash games with both state-dependent stochastic noise and unknown deterministic disturbance.
In this paper, we discuss theoretical and numerical aspects by extending the results of (Broek et al., 2003; Engwerda, 2005 Engwerda, ,2006 in the deterministic case to the soft-constrained stochastic Nash games governed by Itô's differential equations with state-dependent noise. It is noteworthy that earlier studies on weakly coupled stochastic Nash games (Srikant and Basar, 1992) did not take the state-dependent noise into consideration. Further, even the deterministic disturbance input was not considered. On the other hand, although the stochastic H 2 /H ∞ control was considered, stochastic noise and unknown deterministic disturbance (Chen and Zhang, 2004) involving multiple players were not addressed. The main contributions of this paper are as follows. First, linear quadratic differential games are investigated with respect to an infinite horizon. After formulating the softconstrained problem for the one-player case, a set of sufficient conditions is given as the saddle-point solution.
Moreover, in order to guarantee the existence of strategy sets, sets of cross-coupled stochastic algebraic Riccati equations (CSAREs) are introduced for the first time. Second, for solving CSAREs, Newton's method is directly applied to find their solution. Another important feature is that a new high-order approximation strategy based on the numerical solution of CSAREs is established. Finally, in order to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed algorithm, a numerical example is provided for practical megawatt-frequency control problems.
Notations: The notations used in this paper are fairly standard. δ ij denotes the Kronecker delta. I n denotes an n × n identity matrix. block diag denotes a block diagonal matrix. || · || denotes the Euclidean norm of a matrix. 
|| · ||

Soft-constrained Stochastic Nash Games
Consider stochastic linear time-invariant weakly coupled large-scale systems 1 .
where
It should be noted that the generalized derivative of the Wiener process is called Gaussian white noise. Hence, we can also consider the problem by introducing the same equation that has been studied in (Gajić and Losada, 1999) .
.. , M is a onedimensional standard Wiener process defined in the filtered probability space (Ugrinovskii, 1998; Hinrichsen and Pritchard, 1998; Chen and Zhang, 2004; Rami and Zhou, 2000) . Moreover,
is considered to be an unknown finite-energy deterministic disturbance (Ugrinovskii, 1998; Chen and Zhang, 2004) . Without loss of generality, it is assumed that w r (t) and w s (t) are mutually independent for all r, s = 1, ... , M and E[w(t) w
Here, ε denotes a relatively small positive coupling parameter that relates the linear system with the other subsystems 2 . It should be noted that the considered linear large-scale stochastic systems (1) cannot be treated by using the existing technique used in (Broek et al., 2003; Mukaidani 2006; Mukaidani 2007; Sagara et al, 2008) because the stochastic and deterministic uncertainties are both included.
The cost function for each strategy subset is defined by
where i = 1, ... , N ,
The weighting matrix V iµ is always symmetric and positive definite for all i = 1, ... , N . On the other hand, the state weight matrices Q iε are symmetric and assumed to be sign-indefinite (Broek et al., 2003; Engwerda, 2005 Engwerda, ,2006 . In many applications of differential games, state changes that are beneficial to some players may be harmful to other players; thus we allow for the state weighting matrices Q iε to be indefinite. Although this allowance causes considerable technical complications, this generality would be natural in the multiplayer context (Engwerda, 2005) .
In this paper, R ij = 0 is allowed, provided the parameter µ in the cost function is scaled. However, in order to simplify the algebra, it is assumed that µ denotes a small positive parameter, which is of the same order as the small parameter ε.
The following stabilizability, which is an essential assumption, has been introduced in (Chen and Zhang, 2004) .
Definition 1 (Chen and Zhang, 2004 
It is noteworthy that in this study, the strategies u * i are restricted as linear feedback strategies (Basar, 1974) such as u i := F iε x. We consider the formulation of the objective functions of the players in order to express a desire for robustness.
Since V iµ has a minus sign in J i , this matrix constrains the disturbance vector v in an indirect way; therefore, it can be used to describe the aversion to the model risk of player i (Broek et al., 2003) .
Let F N denote the set of all (F 1ε , ... , F N ε ) such that the following closed-loop stochastic system (4) is asymptotically mean-square stable. According to the feedback information structure, a set of equilibrium strategies should be independent of the initial state. Furthermore, the strategies should satisfy the usual equilibrium inequalities. A formal definition is given below.
Definition 2 (Broek et al., 2003; Engwerda, 2005 Engwerda, ,2006 The strategy set
is a softconstrained stochastic Nash equilibrium strategy set if for each i = 1, ... , N , the following inequality holds:
for all x(0) and for all (
In the next section, we discuss the one-player case.
One-player Case
First, a one-player case is discussed. The result obtained for that particular case is used as the basis for the derivation of results for the general N -player case.
Consider a linear time-invariant stochastic stabilizable system
It should be noted that strategy spaces involve a linear feedback strategy with a memory-less perfect-state information structure (Basar, 1974) . The cost function is given below.
Let us define the strategy spaces
The following theorem generalizes the existing results of (Broek et al., 2003; Engwerda, 2005 Engwerda, ,2006 ; these results are very important in deterministic soft-constrained Nash games for a stochastic case.
Theorem 4
Assume that for all (u 1 , v) ∈ Γ u × Γ v , the closed-loop system is asymptotically mean-square stable. Suppose the following stochastic algebraic Riccati equation (SARE) (9) has a solution P ε ≥ 0.
Furthermore, suppose there exists a real symmetric matrix W ε that satisfies matrix inequality (10).
The strategy pair
is in saddle-point equilibrium. That is, if these conditions hold then inequality (8) related to cost function
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix I.
Note that if Q 1ε ≥ 0, condition (10) is trivially satisfied by choosing W ε = 0. Otherwise, it is sufficient to have a symmetric solution W ε of inequality (10). As a special case, W ε = −P ε may be considered from a natural point of view.
The concept in inequality (10) is very important to generalize the result for a non-definite Q 1ε matrix. Thus, we first introduced an arbitrary matrix W ε . It should be noted that this condition is considerably less stringent than the condition Q 1ε ≥ 0.
Soft-constrained Stochastic Nash Equilibrium
The soft-constrained stochastic Nash games are given below. 
Theorem 5 Assume that for all
u i (t) ∈ Γ u , i = 1, ... , N and v(t) ∈ Γ v ,F i (ε, µ, P 1ε , ... , P N ε ) = P iε A + A T P iε + M ∑ p=1 A T pε P iε A pε − P iε S iε P iε +µ N ∑ j=1, j =i P jε S ijε P jε + P iε M iε P iε + Q iε = 0, (12a) W iε A + A T W iε + M ∑ p=1 A T pε W iε A pε − W iε S iε W iε +µ N ∑ j=1, j =i P jε S ijε P jε + Q iε ≥ 0,(12b)where i = 1, ... , N , A := A ε − ∑ N j=1, j =i S jε P jε , S iε := B iε R −1 ii B T iε , S ijε := B jε R −1 jj R ij R −1 jj B T jε , i = j, M iε := E ε V −1 iµ E T ε . Define the set (F * 1ε , ... , F * N ε ) by u * i (t) := F * iε x(t) = −R −1 ii B T iε P iε x(t), i = 1, .. , N. (13) Then, (F * 1ε , ... , F * N ε ) ∈ F N ,
and this strategy set denotes the soft-constrained stochastic Nash equilibrium. Further
Proof: Now, let us consider the following problem in which the cost function (14) is minimal at
Note that the function φ coincides with function J in Theorem 4. Applying Theorem 4 to this minimization problem as
yields the fact that the function φ is minimal at
Moreover, the minimal value is x T (0)P iε x(0). It should be noted that if Q iε ≥ 0 and S ijε ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ... , N , matrix inequality (12b) is trivially satisfied by W iε = 0 (Broek et al., 2003; Engwerda, 2005 Engwerda, ,2006 . In the case that one of these matrices is not positive semidefinite, one might consider W iε = −P iε as a solution to (12b).
Asymptotic Structure of CSAREs
First, the asymptotic structure of CSAREs (12a) is established. Since A ε , A pε , S iε , S ijε , Q iε and M iε include the parameter ε, the solution P iε of CSAREs (12a), if it exists, should contain the parameter ε. By considering this fact, the solution P iε of CSAREs (12a) is assumed to have the following structure.
It should be noted that this assumption originated from the simulation results. In fact, when CSAREs (12a) are solved, the structure (17) can be predicted easily for various small ε.
The following reduced-order stochastic algebraic Riccati equation (SARE) is obtained by substituting the matrices A ε , A pε , S iε , S ijε , Q iε , M iε and P iε into (12a); letting ε = µ = 0; and partitioning CSAREs (12a). Herē P ii , i = 1, ... , N is the 0-order solution 3 of CSAREs (12a) as ε = µ = 0.
ii . It may be noted that there is a unique positive semidefinite solution of (18) (Dragan and Morozan, 1997) .
The following condition is assumed.
Assumption 6
The following matrices are nonsingular.
3 The first order approximations Piε corresponding to ε are called 0-order solutions.
The asymptotic expansion of CSAREs (12a) for ε = µ = 0 is described by the following theorem. 
Proof: This can be proved by applying the implicit function theorem (Jittorntrum, 1978) on CSAREs (12a). In order to do this, it is sufficient to show that the corresponding Jacobian is nonsingular at ε = 0. The derivative of the function F i (ε, µ, P 1ε , ... , P N ε ) at matrix P iε is given by
where i = j, j = 1, ... , N and Θ :
Based on the fact that S jε P iε = O(ε), i = j, after performing some algebraic calculations, the Jacobian of CSAREs (12a) in the limit ε → +0, µ → +0 can be expressed as
Obviously, D ii , i = 1, ... , N are nonsingular under Assumption 6. Thus, detJ = 0, i.e., J is nonsingular for ε = µ = 0. As a consequence of the implicit function theorem, this implies that there exists a unique continuous mapping P iε := H i (ε) that possesses the Taylor series expansion at ε = 0 (Kokotović et al., 1999) ; in other words
i (0). Thus we have an equation with the form of (20). On the other hand, taking into account the fact thatP ii is a positive definite matrix, for sufficiently small parameters ε and µ, P iε is also a positive definite solution.
It is noteworthy that the asymptotic structure of (20) can also be obtained by applying a result that will be given later as k = 0 in Theorem 8.
Newton's Method
In order to obtain the solution of CSAREs (12a), Newton's method can be applied.
jε with the initial conditions
It is easy to show that equation (23) is equivalent to the Newton's method. In fact, equation (23) can be revised as follows.
In general, it is well known that there exist several softconstrained Nash equilibriums such as those in ordinary Nash games.
The following theorem give a feature of the uniqueness. ... , N, k = 0, 1, ... . (25) Proof: The proof is given directly by applying the Newton-Kantorovich theorem (Ortega, 1990; Yamamoto, 1986) for CSAREs (12a). A positive scalar γ can be immediately obtained from CSAREs (12a) such that for any P a iε and P b iε
Moreover, it is easy to verify that ∇F (ε, µ,P 1 , ... ,P N ) = J + O(ε) is nonsingular because for the small parameters ε and µ and using (20), J is also nonsingular. Therefore, there exists β such that
Finally, the NewtonKantorovich theorem yields the desired results (25).
Second, the local uniqueness of the solution is discussed. Let us define
iε || < R } is in the certain convex set D. Subsequently, since the solution P * iε is unique in S, the local uniqueness of P * iε is guaranteed in the neighbourhood of ε = 0 for a subset S by applying the NewtonKantorovich theorem.
It should be noted that for solving the cross-coupled stochastic algebraic Lyapunov equations (CSALEs) (23) that appear in Newton's method, fixed-point algorithm can also be combined. See (Mukaidani, 2006; Sagara et al., 2007) for details.
High-order Approximate Soft-constrained Stochastic Nash Strategies
We focus our attention on the design of high-order approximate soft-constrained stochastic Nash strategies. Such strategies are obtained by using iterative solution (23).
Theorem 9 Suppose that SARE (18) has a positive definite solution such that
Then, there exists a small constantσ and positive scalar parameters α > 0 and β > 0 such that for all ε ∈ (0,σ),
given by (26) and v(t) = 0 is exponentially mean-square stable.
Proof: First, it is easy to verify that
Hence, using the stability assumption of D ii , it can be shown that there exists a small constantσ and positive scalar parameters α > 0 and β > 0 such that for all
Let us consider the closed-loop stochastic system (28).
The representation of the solution of equation (28) is given as
Using inequality
||a l || 2 and considering the independence of the Wiener processes w p (t) yields
E||x(t)||
Thus, the conditions
From the Bellman-Gronwall inequality (Wu et al., 1994) it follows that
Since ω has been selected such that ω < 2/(M + 1), equation (28) is exponentially mean-square stable. The degradation of the cost functional via new highorder approximate soft-constrained stochastic Nash strategies (26) is given as follows.
Theorem 10 Under Assumption 6, the application of high-order approximate soft-constrained stochastic Nash strategies (26) to stochastic systems (1) results inJ i satisfying the relation
The following lemma will play an important role in establishing performance degradation.
Lemma 11 Consider the stochastic system
and the corresponding cost function
Assume that stochastic system (34) is asymptotically mean-square stable. Suppose that the following SARE has a solution L ε ≥ 0.
where Then, the maximum ofĴ(v, x(0) ) is uniquely attained bȳ
The proof of Lemma 11 is given in Appendix II.
Proof of Theorem 10:
This can be proved directly by applying the Newton-Kantorovich theorem (Ortega, 1990; Yamamoto, 1986) . When u (k) * i (t) is used, the equilibrium values of the cost functional is given by (38) because of Lemma 11.
where Z iε is a positive definite solution of the following SALEs
Subtracting (12a) from (39) and using the result of (25),
Since the function G(Z iε ) is continuous at any Z iε , taking the partial derivative of the function G(Z iε ) with respect to Z iε yields
Thus, by using Assumption 6, there exists a small constant σ such that for all ε ∈ (0,σ),
T pε is nonsingular. Then, for any matrices X ε and Y ε that belong to Z iε , it is immediately obtained from equation (41) that
Using the Newton-Kantorovich theorem, the estimate is given by
Hence, since
Numerical Example
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of the softconstrained stochastic Nash games, we present results for the megawatt-frequency control problem of multiarea electric energy systems. The model is based on the multistage decomposition of two interconnected areas (Elgerd and Fosha, 1970) . The detailed physical significances of the model were also developed in (Gajić et al., 1990) . The system matrices are given as follows. 
Small parameters ε = 0.1 and µ = 0 are selected. In order to guarantee the feasibility of the solution, we consider that the difference in the area power angle for the model presented in (Gajić et al., 1990 ) is 60 degrees.
It should be noted that both the deterministic disturbance distribution and the state-dependent noise related to the load frequency constant (Elgerd and Fosha, 1970) are considered. That is, the nature of stochastic uncertainty considered here is not addressed in (Gajić et al., 1990) . We suppose that the error of the load frequency constant is within 5% of the nominal value. Therefore, the proposed design method is very useful because the resulting strategy can be implemented to more practical weakly coupled large-scale stochastic systems.
The proposed computational algorithm was developed in MATLAB 5.2 and Control System Toolbox 5.2 for simulation purposes. Moreover, the computer used in this simulation was a Pentium M 1200 MHz with 632MB RAM, running Windows XP.
It is easy to verify that for the two-players case, algorithm (23) converges to the exact solution of CSAREs (12a) with an accuracy of ||F (k) || < 1.0e − 11 after seven iterations, where
2ε )||. In order to verify the accuracy of the solution, the remainder per iteration is substituted by P (k) iε into CSAREs (12a). In Table 1 , the results of the error ||F (k) || per iteration are given. It can be seen that algorithm (23) yields quadratic convergence.
Finally, high-order approximate soft-constrained stochastic Nash strategies are obtained as follows. 
As a result, although both state-dependent stochastic noise and unknown deterministic disturbance are included, the high-order approximate Nash strategy was obtained.
Conclusion
In this paper, infinite-horizon stochastic Nash games were discussed. First, conditions required for the existence of Nash equilibrium were established by utilizing CSAREs. Second, after establishing an asymptotic structure along with positive definiteness for solving CSAREs, Newton method was adopted. As a result, it was shown that quadratic convergence can be attained. Thus, the proposed algorithm is expected to be very useful and reliable for a sufficiently small value of ε. As another important feature, a high-order approximate strategy that yields better cost performance was attained. In fact, the cost degradation by using the proposed approximate strategy was demonstrated.
]
dt. Introducing ξ(t) :=x(t) −x(t) yields dξ(t) = [(A ε − S 1ε P ε )ξ(t) + B 1ε ν(t)]dt + ∑ M p=1 A pε ξ(t)dw p (t), ξ(0) = 0, η(t) = V −1 1µ E T ε P ε ξ(t). Hence, taking into account the fact that for any ν(t), the closed-loop system is asymptotically mean-square stable, E ∫ ∞ 0 Since inequality (10) holds, the desired result is obtained.
d||ξ(t)||
] = E ∫ ∞ 0 [ ||ν(t)|| 2 R11 − ξ T (t) [ P ε E ε V −1 1µ E T ε P ε + P ε (A ε − S 1ε P ε ) + (A ε − S 1ε P ε ) T P ε + ∑ M p=1 A T pε P ε A pε ] ξ(t) − 2ξ T (t)P ε B 1ε ν(t) ] dt = E ∫ ∞ 0 [ ||ν(t) +
